There are only a few learning algorithms applicable to stochastic dynamic games. Learning in games is generally difficult because of the non-stationary environment in which each decision maker aims to learn its optimal decisions with minimal information in the presence of the other decision makers who are also learning. In the case of dynamic games, learning is more challenging because, while learning, the decision makers alter the state of the system and hence the future cost. In this paper, we present decentralized Q-learning algorithms for stochastic dynamic games, and study their convergence for the weakly acyclic case. We show that the decision makers employing these algorithms would eventually be using equilibrium policies almost surely in large classes of stochastic dynamic games.
1. Introduction. This paper aims at developing new learning algorithms with desirable convergence properties for certain classes of stochastic dynamic games. More specifically, we focus on weakly acyclic games that can be used to model cooperative systems. The chief merit of the paper lies in the fact that dynamic games, as opposed to "static" games, are considered. Hence, the policies selected by the decision makers not only impact their immediate cost but also alter the games to be played in the future through the state dynamics. Hence, our results are applicable to a significantly broader set of applications.
The existing literature on learning in stochastic dynamic games is very small, in contrast to learning in repeated games in which the same single-stage game is played in every stage. As the method of reinforcement learning gained popularity in the context of Markov decision problems, a surge of interest in generalizing the method of reinforcement learning, in particular Q-learning algorithm [34] , to stochastic dynamic games has led to a set of publications primarily in the computer science literature; see [28] and the references therein. In many of these publications, the authors tend to assume that the real objective of the agents is for some reason to find and play an equilibrium strategy (and sometimes this even requires agents to somehow agree on a particular equilibrium strategy), and not necessarily to pursue their own objectives. Another serious issue is that the multi-agent algorithms introduced in many of these recent papers are not scalable since each agent needs to maintain Q-values for each state/joint action pair and compute an equilibrium at each step of the algorithm using the updated Q-values, assuming that the actions and objectives are exchanged between all players.
Standard Q-learning, which enables an agent to learn how to play optimally in a single-agent environment, has also been applied to very specific multi agent applications [29, 26] . Here, each agent runs a standard Q-learning algorithm by ignoring the other agents, and hence information exchange between agents and computational burden on each agent are substantially lower than aforementioned multi-agent extensions of Q-learning algorithm. Also, standard Q-learning in a multi-agent environment makes sense from individual bounded rationality point of view. However, no analytical results exist regarding the properties of standard Q-learning in a stochastic dynamic game setting.
We should also mention several attempts to extend a well-known learning algorithm called Fictitious Play (FP) [4, 24] to stochastic dynamic games [5, 25, 33] . The joint action learning algorithm presented in [5] would be computationally prohibitive quickly as the number of agents/states/actions grow. The algorithms presented in [5] are claimed to be convergent to an equilibrium in single-state single-stage common interest games but without a proof. The extension of FP considered in [25] requires each agent to calculate a stationary policy at each step in response to the empirical frequencies of the stationary policies calculated and announced by other agents in the past. The main contribution of [25] is to show that such FP algorithm is not convergent even in the simplest 2x2x2 stochastic dynamic game where there are two states and two agents with two moves for each agent. The version of FP used in [33] is applicable only to zero-some games (strictly adversarial games), and it resembles a centralized algorithm to compute equilibrium instead of a strategic learning mechanism.
Other related work includes [1, 2, 3] . In [1] , a multi-agent version of an actor-critic algorithm [13] is shown to be convergent to generalized equilibria in a weak sense of convergence, whereas in [2] a policy iteration algorithm is presented without rigorous results for stochastic dynamic games. The algorithms given in [1, 2] are rational from individual agent perspective, however they require higher level of data storing and processing than standard Q-learning. The paper [3] uses the policy iteration algorithm given in [2] in conjunction with certain approximation methods to deal with a large state-space in a specific card-game without rigorous results.
We should emphasize that our viewpoint is individual bounded rationality and strategic decision making, that is, agents should act to pursue their own objectives even in the short term using localized information and reasonable algorithms. It is also desired that agent strategies converge to an agreeable solution in cooperative situations where agent objectives are aligned with system designer's objective even though agents do not necessarily strive for converging to a particular strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, the model is introduced. Section 3 is devoted to the specifics of the learning paradigm and the standard Q-learning algorithm. In §4, our first Q-learning algorithm is introduced and its convergence properties are presented. Generalizations of our main results in §4 are presented in §5. This is followed by a simulation study in §6. The paper is concluded with some final remarks in §7. The appendix contains the proofs of the technical results in the paper.
Stochastic Dynamic
Games. Consider the (discrete-time) networked control system illustrated in Figure 1 where x t is the state of the system at time t, u i t is the input generated by controller i at time t, and w t is the random disturbance input at time t. Suppose that each controller i is an autonomous decision maker interested in minimizing its own long-term cost
where c i (x t , u 1 t , . . . , u N t ) is the cost incurred by controller i at time t, and E[·] denotes the expectation on a probability space (Ω, F , P ). Although controller i can only choose its own decisions u i 0 , u i 1 , . . . , its cost generally depends on the decisions of all controllers through its single-stage cost as well as the state dynamics. This dynamic coupling between self-interested decision makers with long-term objectives naturally lead to the framework of stochastic dynamic games [27] which generalize Markov decision problems [21, 8] .
2.1. Discounted Stochastic Dynamic Games. A (finite) discounted stochastic dynamic game has the following ingredients; see [27, 20, 22, 32, 23] .
(i) a finite set of DMs with the i−th DM referred to as DM i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N } (ii) a finite set X of states (iii) a finite set U i of control decisions for each DM i (iv) a cost function c i for each DM i determining DM i 's cost c i (x, u 1 , . . . , u N ) at each state x ∈ X and for each joint decision (u 1 , . . . , u N ) ∈ U 1 × · · · U N (v) a discount factor β i ∈ (0, 1) for each DM i (vi) a random initial state x 0 ∈ X (vii) a transition kernel to determine the probability P [x ′ |x, u 1 , . . . , u N ] of each state transition from x ∈ X to x ′ ∈ X for each joint decision (u 1 , . . . , u N ) ∈ U 1 ×· · · U N . Such a stochastic dynamic game induces a discrete-time controlled Markov process where the state at time t is denoted by x t ∈ X starting with the initial state x 0 . At any time t ≥ 0, each DM i makes a control decision u i t ∈ U i (possibly randomly) based on the available information. The state x t and the joint decisions (u 1 t , ..., u N t ) together determine each DM i 's cost c i (x t , u 1 t , ..., u N t ) at time t as well as the probability distribution P [ · | x t , u 1 t , ..., u N t ] with which the next state x t+1 is selected. A policy for a DM is a rule of choosing an appropriate control decision at any time based on the DM's history of observations. We will focus on stationary Markov policies of the form where a DM's decision at time t is determined solely based on the state x t . Such policies for each DM i are identified by mappings from the state space X to the set P(U i ) of probability distributions on U i . The interpretation is that a DM i using such a policy π i : X → P(U i ) makes its decision u i t at any time t by choosing randomly from U i according to π i (x t ). We will denote the set of such policies by ∆ i for each DM i . We will primarily be interested in deterministic (stationary Markov) policies 1 denoted by Π i for each DM i , where each policy π i ∈ Π i is identified by a mapping from X to U i . The objective of each DM i is to find a policy π i ∈ ∆ i that minimizes its average discounted cost
for all x ∈ X, where E x denotes the conditional expectation given x 0 = x. Since DMs have possibly different cost and each DM's cost may depend on the polices of the other DMs, we adopt the notion of equilibrium to represent those policies that are person-by-person optimal. For ease of notation, we denote the policies of all DMs other than DM i by π −i . We also write a joint policy (π 1 , . . . π N ) as (π i , π −i ) and J i x (π 1 , . . . π N ) as J i x (π i , π −i ). Definition 2.1. A joint policy (π * 1 , . . . , π * N ) constitutes an (Markov perfect) equilibrium if, for all i, x,
It is known that any finite discounted stochastic dynamic game possesses an equilibrium policy as defined above [11] . Although the minimum above can always be achieved by a deterministic policy in Π i (since each DM i 's problem is a stationary Markov decision problem), a deterministic equilibrium policy may not exist in general. However, many interesting classes of games do possess equilibrium in deterministic policies. In particular, the games arising from applications where all DMs benefit from cooperation possess equilibrium in deterministic policies. As such, we are primarily interested in the set of deterministic equilibrium policies denoted by Π eq , where Π eq is a subset of the set of deterministic joint policies Π := Π 1 × · · · × Π N .
We next present a formalization of the classes of games that can be used to model cooperative systems.
2.2.
Weakly Acyclic Games. The classes of games in which cooperation occurs most naturally are those in which all DMs have identical cost, also known as team problems. Although team problems are interesting and useful to model cooperative systems, they constitute a very small and special subclass of the games arising from the cooperative systems applications. For example, DMs would clearly cooperate in a game (not necessarily a team problem) in which the deterministic joint policies can be ordered, i.e., one joint policy in each pair of joint policies results in lower cost for all DMs. If there are finite number of joint policies in such a game, then there will be at least one joint policy with lowest cost for all DMs. One way of generalizing the notion of cooperation in games leads to so-called weakly acyclic games [35] .
Let Π i π −i denote DM i 's set of (deterministic) best replies to any
DM i 's best replies to any π −i ∈ ∆ −i can be characterized by its optimal Q-factors Q i π −i satisfying the fixed point equation
for all x, u i . One can then write Π i π −i as
The set of (deterministic) joint best replies is denoted by Π π := Π 1 π −1 × · · · × Π N π −N . Any best replyπ i ∈ Π i π −i of DM i is called a strict best reply with respect to (π i , π −i ) if
Definition 2.2. We call a (possibly finite) sequence of deterministic joint policies π 0 , π 1 , . . . a strict best reply path if, for each k, π k and π k+1 differ in exactly one DM position, say DM i , and π i k+1 is a strict best reply with respect to π k . Definition 2.3. A discounted stochastic dynamic game is called weakly acyclic under strict best replies if there is a strict best reply path starting from each deterministic joint policy and ending at a deterministic equilibrium policy. Figure 2 shows the strict best reply graph of a game where the nodes represent the deterministic joint policies and the directed edges represent the single-DM strict best replies. Each deterministic equilibrium policy is represented by a sink, i.e., a node with no outgoing edges, in such a graph. Note that the game illustrated in Figure 2 is weakly acyclic under strict best replies since there is a path from every node to a sink (π 7 or π 10 ). Note also that a weakly acyclic game may have cycles in its strict best reply graph, for example, π 1 → π 4 → π 12 → π 9 in Figure 2 .
Weakly acyclic games constitute a fairly large class of games. In the case of singlestage games, all potential games as well as dominance solvable games are examples of weakly acyclic games; see [7] . We note that the concept of weak acyclicity introduced in this paper is with respect to the stationary Markov policies for stochastic dynamic games, and constitutes a generalization of weak acyclicity introduced in [35] for single-stage games. The primary examples of weakly acyclic games in the case of stochastic dynamic games are the team problems with finite state and control sets where DMs have identical cost functions and discount factors. Clearly, many other classes of stochastic dynamic games are weakly acyclic, e.g., appropriate multi-stage generalizations of potential games and dominance solvable games.
A Policy Adjustment Process for Weakly Acyclic Games.
Consider a policy adjustment process in which only one DM updates its policy at each step by switching to one of its strict best replies. Such a process would terminate at an equilibrium policy if the game has no cycles in its strict best reply graph and the process continues until no DM has strict best replies. A weakly acyclic game may contain cycles in its strict best reply graph but there must be some edges leaving each cycle because otherwise there would not be a path from each node to a sink. Therefore, as long as each updating DM considers each of its strict best replies with positive probability, the adjustment process would terminate at an equilibrium policy in a weakly acyclic game as well. This adjustment process would require a criterion to determine the updating DM at each step and the DMs would have to a priori agree to this criterion. An equilibrium policy can be reached through a similar adjustment process without a pre-game agreement on the selection of the updating DM, if all DMs update their policies at each step but with some inertia. Consider now the following policy adjustment process for each DM i .
Initialize
End On the one hand, if the joint policy π k := (π 1 k , . . . , π N k ) is an equilibrium policy at any step k, then the policies will never change in the subsequent steps. On the other hand, regardless of what the joint policy π k := (π 1 k , . . . , π N k ) is at any step k, the joint policy π k+L in L steps later will be an equilibrium policy with positive probability p min > 0 where L is the maximum length of the shortest strict best reply path from any policy to an equilibrium policy and p min depends only on the inertias λ 1 , . . . , λ N , and L. This readily implies that the process will reach an equilibrium policy in finite number of steps with probability one, i.e., P [π k ∈ Π eq , for some k < ∞] = 1.
We now note that each updating DM i at step k needs to compute its best replies Π i π −i k , which can be done by first solving the fixed point equation (2.2). DM i can solve (2.2), for example through value iterations, provided that DM i knows the state transition probabilities P and the policies of the other DMs π −i k to evaluate the expectations in (2.2). In most realistic situations, DMs would not have access to such information and therefore would not be able to adjust their policies according to the process above. In the next subsection, we introduce our learning paradigm in which DMs would be able to learn their best policies with minimal information and adjust their policies (approximately) along the strict best reply paths as in the adjustment process above.
Learning Paradigm for Stochastic Dynamic
Games. The learning setup involves specifying the information that DMs have access to. We assume that each DM i knows its own set U i of decisions and its own discount factor β i . In addition, before choosing its decision u i t at any time t, each DM i has the knowledge of (i) its own past decisions u i 0 , . . . , u i t−1 , and (ii) past and current state realizations x 0 , . . . , x t , and (iii) its own past cost realizations
. Each DM i has access to no other information such as the state transition probabilities or any information regarding the other DMs (not even the existence of the other DMs). In effect, the problem of decision making from the perspective of each DM i appears to be a stationary Markov decision problem. It is reasonable that each DM i with this view of its environment would use the standard Q-learning algorithm [34] to learn its optimal Q-factors and its optimal decisions. This would lead to the following Q-learning dynamics for each DM i :
where α i t ∈ [0, 1] denotes DM i 's step size at time t. If only one DM, say DM i , were to use Q-learning and the other DMs used constant policies π −i , then DM i would asymptotically learn its corresponding optimal Q-factors, i.e.,
provided that all state-control pairs x, u i are visited infinitely often and the step sizes are reduced at a proper rate. This follows from the well-known convergence of Q-learning in a stationary environment; see [30] . To exploit the learnt Q-factors while maintaining exploration, the actual decisions are often selected with very high probability as
and with some small probability any decision in U i is experimented. One common way of achieving this for DM i is to select any decision u i ∈ U i randomly according to (Boltzman action selection)
where τ > 0 is a small constant called the temperature parameter. However, when all DMs use Q-learning and select their decisions as described above, the environment is non-stationary for all DMs, and there is no reason to expect convergence in that case. In fact, one can construct examples where DMs using Q-learning are caught up in persistent oscillations. However, the convergence of Q-learning may still be possible in team problems, coordination-type games, or more generally in weakly-acyclic games. It is instructive to first consider the repeated games.
Convergence of Q-Learning in Repeated Games.
Here, there is no state dynamics (the set X of states is a singleton) and the DMs have no look-ahead (β 1 = · · · β N = 0). The only dynamics in this case is due to Q-learning which reduces to the averaging dynamics
The long-term behavior of these averaging dynamics is analyzed in [15] and strongly connected to the long-term behavior of the well-known Stochastic Fictitious Play (SFP) dynamics in the case of two DMs; see [10] for SFP. In two-DM SFP, each DM i tracks the empirical frequencies of the past decisions of its opponent DM −i and chooses a nearly optimal response (with some experimentation) based on the incorrect assumption that DM −i will choose its decisions according to the empirical frequencies of its past decisions
where I{·} is the indicator function and
By § 4 in [15] , the convergence of SFP dynamics implies the convergence of Qlearning dynamics (3.2)-(3.3) for two DMs. Since SFP dynamics are known to converge in two-DM team problems, the convergence of Q-learning (3.2)-(3.3) is established in team problems with two DMs. It is possible to extend this convergence result to two-DM potential games, a generalization of team problems contained in weakly acyclic games [19, 17] . Convergence in potential games with more than two DMs may be possible but it is currently unresolved. However, establishing the convergence of Q-learning even in all two-DM weakly acyclic games does not seem to be possible.
A counterexample to the convergence of Fictitious Play (where DMs choose exact optimal responses with no experimentation, i.e., τ ↓ 0) is provided in [9] . This counterexample involves a single-stage coordination game (which is a weakly acyclic game) with two DMs, called the merry-go-round game, in which each DM has the same set of decisions U 1 = U 2 = {1, . . . , 9} represented by the rows and the columns of the payoff matrices in Figure 3 . The first (second) number in each cell corresponding to each joint decision is the payoff to the first (second) DM. Each DM wishes to maximize its payoff; therefore, the joint decisions resulting in the highest payoffs (6, 6) to both DMs are those along the diagonal, which requires the DMs to coordinate on one of the 9 possible decisions.
It is rigorously shown in [9] that FP in this merry-go-round game exhibits a persistent cycle illustrated in Figure 3 . Furthermore, it is shown that this cycle is robust to slight payoff perturbations. In addition, the authors conjecture that this cycle would withstand the stochastic perturbations of SFP, which would imply that Q-learning would not converge in this two-DM coordination game (which is weakly acyclic) either. In summary, it is likely that the possibility of learning an equilibrium policy via Q-learning does not go beyond repeated potential games.
It is possible to employ additional features such as the truncation of the observation history or multi-time-scale learning to obtain learning dynamics that are convergent in all repeated weakly acyclic games; see our own previous work [18] and the others [14, 35, 12, 16] . However, the question of learning an equilibrium policy in stochastic dynamic games is an open question. The only relevant reference considering the stochastic dynamic games is [1] where each DM uses value learning coupled with policy search at a slower time-scale. The results in [1] apply to all stochastic dynamic games and therefore they are necessarily quite weak. Loosely speaking, the main result in [1] shows that the limit points of certain empirical measures (weighted with the step sizes) in the policy space constitute "generalized Nash equilibria", which in particular does not imply convergence of learning to an equilibrium policy. In the next section, we propose a simple variation of Q-learning which converges to an equilibrium policy in all weakly acyclic stochastic dynamic games.
Q-Learning in Stochastic Dynamic
Games. The discussion in the previous subsection reveals that the standard Q-learning (3.2)-(3.3) can lead to robust oscillations even in repeated coordination games. The main obstacle to convergence of Q-learning in games is due to the presence of multiple active learners leading to a non-stationary environment for all learners. To overcome this obstacle, we use some inspiration from our previous work [18] on repeated games and modify the Q-learning for stochastic dynamic games as follows. In our variation of Q-learning, we allow DMs to use constant policies for extended periods of time called exploration phases. As illustrated in Figure 4 , the k−th exploration phase runs through times t = t k , . . . , t k+1 − 1, where
for some integer T k ∈ [1, ∞) denoting the length of the k−th exploration phase. During the k−th exploration phase, DMs use some constant policies π 1 k , . . . , π N k as their baseline policies with occasional experimentation. The essence of the main idea is to create a stationary environment over each exploration phase so that DMs can accurately learn their optimal Q-factors corresponding to the constant policies used during each exploration phase. Before arguing why this would lead to an equilibrium policy in all weakly acyclic stochastic dynamic games, let us introduce our variation of Q-learning more precisely.
Algorithm 1 (for DM i ).
Set parameters
Algorithm 1 mimics the process introduced in §2.3 arbitrarily closely with arbitrarily high probability under certain conditions. Assumption 1. For all (x ′ , x, u 1 , . . . , u N ), P [x ′ |x, u 1 , . . . , u N ] > 0. Assumption 1 ensures that the step sizes satisfy the well-known conditions of the stochastic approximation theory [30] during each exploration phase. It can be relaxed provided every x, u i is visited infinitely often with probability one.
Assumption 2. For all i, 0 < δ i <δ and 0 < ρ i <ρ, whereδ andρ (which depend only on the parameters of the game at hand) are defined in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a discounted stochastic game that is weakly acyclic under strict best replies. Suppose that each DM i updates its policies by Algorithm 1. Let Assumption 1 and 2 hold.
(i) For any ǫ > 0, there existT < ∞,k < ∞ such that if min ℓ T ℓ ≥T , then
(iii) There exists finite integers {T k } k≥0 such that if T k ≥T k , for all k, then P π k → π * = 1, for some π * ∈ Π e .
Proof. See Appendix B. Let us discuss the main idea behind this result. Since all DMs use constant policies throughout any particular exploration phase, each DM indeed faces a stationary Markov decision problem in each exploration phase. Therefore, if the length of each exploration phase is long enough and the experimentation probabilities ρ 1 , . . . , ρ N are small enough (but non-zero), each DM i can learn its corresponding optimal Q-factors in each exploration phase with arbitrary accuracy with arbitrarily high probability. This allows each DM i to accurately compute its near best replies to the other DMs' policies π −i k at the end of the k−th exploration phase. Intuitively, allowing each DM i to update its policy π i k to its near best replies (to π −i k ) at the end of the k−th exploration phase with some inertia λ i ∈ (0, 1) results in a policy adjustment process that approximates the process introduced in §2.3.
Remark 1. One may also wish to find explicit lower-bounds on T k to achieve almost sure convergence based on the convergence rates of the standard Q-learning with a single DM; we refer the reader to [6] for bounds on the convergence rates for standard Q-learning.
Generalizations.

Learning in Weakly Acyclic Games under Strict Better Replies.
We present another Q-learning algorithm with provable convergence to equilibrium in stochastic discounted games that are weakly acyclic under strict better replies. For this, we first introduce the notion of weak acyclicity under strict better replies. Given any π = (π i , π −i ) ∈ ∆, where ∆ := ∆ 1 × · · · × ∆ N , let Υ i π denote DM i 's set of (deterministic) better replies with respect to π, i.e., Υ i π := π i ∈ Π i : J x (π i , π −i ) ≤ J x (π i , π −i ), for all x .
Any better replyπ i ∈ Υ i π of DM i is called a strict better reply (with respect to π) if J i x (π i , π −i ) < J i x (π i , π −i ), for some x.
Definition 5.1. We call a (possibly finite) sequence of deterministic joint policies π 0 , π 1 , . . . a strict better reply path if, for each k, π k and π k+1 differ in exactly one DM position, say DM i , and π i k+1 is a strict better reply with respect to π k . Definition 5.2. A discounted stochastic dynamic game is called weakly acyclic under strict better replies if there is a strict better reply path starting from each deterministic joint policy and ending at a deterministic equilibrium policy.
Since every strict best reply path is also a strict better reply path, the set of games weakly acyclic under better replies contain (in fact, strictly) the set of games weakly acyclic under best replies.
It is straightforward to introduce a policy adjustment process analogous to the one introduced in §2.3 where, at each step, each DM i switches to one of its strict better replies with some inertia. Such a process would clearly converge to an equilibrium in games that are weakly acyclic under strict better replies; moreover, a learning algorithm that we will introduce next can enable DMs to adjust their policies with much less information (as in §3), and follow (approximately) along the strict better reply paths that the adjustment process follows. Algorithm 2 (for DM i ). Set parameters as in Algorithm 1
The counterpart of Theorem 4.1 can be obtained for this algorithm in games that are weakly acyclic under strict better replies.
Assumption 3. For all i, 0 < δ i <δ and 0 < ρ i <ρ, whereδ andρ (which depend only on the parameters of the game at hand) are defined in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.3. Consider a discounted stochastic game that is weakly acyclic under strict better replies. Suppose that each DM i updates its policies by Algorithm 2. Let Assumption 1 and 3 hold.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Each DM i using Algorithm 2 learns the performance of two policies, the baseline policy π i k and the experimental policyπ i k , during the k−th exploration phase. Since any policy except the baseline policy can be chosen as an experimental policy (with equal probability), each DM can switch to any of its strict better replies with positive probability. In contrast, each DM using Algorithm 1 can only switch to one of its strict best replies. As a result, each DM using Algorithm 2 can escape a strict best reply cycle by switching to a strict better reply (if one exists); whereas, any DM using Algorithm 1 cannot. This flexibility comes at the cost of running two Q-learning recursions, one for the baseline policy and the other for the experimental policy, instead of one. However, this flexibility also leads to convergent behavior in a strictly larger set of games.
Asynchronous Learning. One drawback of Algorithm 1 and 2 is that
DMs need to coordinate to synchronize their explorations phases, which is inconsistent with the spirit of the learning paradigm for games. However, synchronization of the exploration phases is not necessary for our convergence results to hold. To see this, let T i k ∈ [1, ∞) denote the length of the k−th exploration phase for DM i , and let t i k denote the time at which DM i starts its k−th exploration phase, i.e., t i 0 = 0 and t i k+1 := t i k + T i k , for k ≥ 0. Moreover, we let the sequence of times 0 = t min
This assumption would be satisfied if, during any exploration phase of any DM, the number of possible policy updates by any other DM is uniformly bounded. Theorem 5.4. Consider a discounted stochastic game that is weakly acyclic under strict best (better) replies. Suppose that each DM i updates its policies by the asynchronous version of Algorithm 1 (Algorithm 2). Let Assumption 1, 2 (3), and 4 hold.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Learning in Weakly Acyclic
Games under multi-DM Strict Best or Better Replies. The notion of weak acyclicity can be generalized by allowing multiple DMs to simultaneously update their policies in a strict best or better reply path.
Definition 5.5. We call a (possibly finite) sequence of deterministic joint policies π 0 , π 1 , . . . a multi-DM strict best (better) reply path if, for each k, π k and π k+1 differ for at least one DM and, for each deviating DM i , π i k+1 is a strict best (better) reply with respect to π k .
Definition 5.6. A discounted stochastic dynamic game is called weakly acyclic under multi-DM strict best (better) replies if there is a multi-DM strict best (better) reply path starting from each deterministic joint policy and ending at a deterministic equilibrium policy.
This generalization leads to a strictly larger set of games that are weakly acyclic. To see this, consider a single-stage game characterized by the cost matrices in Figure 5 where DM 1 chooses a row, DM 2 chooses a column, and DM 3 chooses a matrix, simultaneously. Assume a > 0. There is no strict best (or better) reply path to an equilibrium from the joint decisions (1, 1, 1), (1, 3, 1), (3, 3, 1), (3, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (3, 1, 2), if only a single DM can update its decision at a time. Therefore, this game is not weakly acyclic under strict best (or better) replies in the sense of Definition 2.3 (or Definition 5.2). However, if multiple DMs are allowed to switch to their strict best (or better) replies simultaneously, then it becomes possible to reach the equilibrium (2, 3, 2) from any joint decision. For example, if DM 2 and DM 3 switch to their strict best (or better) replies simultaneously from the joint decision (1, 1, 1) , then the resulting joint decision would be (1, 3, 2) . This would subsequently lead to the equilibrium (2, 3, 2) if DM 1 switches to its strict best (or better) reply from (1, 3, 2) . All learning algorithms introduced in the paper allow multiple DMs to simultaneously update their policies with positive probability. In view of this, it is straightforward to see that our main convergence results Theorem 4.1 (Theorem 5.3) as well as Theorem 5.4 hold in games that are weakly acyclic under multi-DM strict best (better) replies.
A Simulation Study.
We consider a discounted stochastic game with two DMs where X = U 1 = U 2 = {1, 2}. Each DM i 's utility (to be maximized) at each time t ≥ 0 depends only on the joint decisions (u 1 t , u 2 t ) of both DMs as DM i : where γ ∈ (0, 1) and P [x 0 = 1] = 1/2.
The single-stage game corresponds to the well-known prisoner's dilemma where the i−th prisoner (DM i ) cooperates (defects) at time t by choosing u i t = 1 (u i t = 2). The single-stage game has a unique equilibrium (u 1 , u 2 ) = (2, 2), i.e., both DMs defect, leading to rewards (0, 0). The dilemma is that each DM can do strictly better by cooperating, i.e., (u 1 , u 2 ) = (1, 1) (not an equilibrium).
In the multi-stage game, the state x t indicates, with probability 1 − γ, whether or not both DMs cooperated in the previous stage. It turns out that cooperation can be obtained in the multi-stage game if the DMs are patient, i.e., the discount factors are sufficiently high, and the error probability γ is sufficiently small . Note that each DM i has four different policies of the form π i : X → U i . For large enough β 1 , β 2 , and small enough γ, the multi-stage game has two (Markov perfect) equilibria. In one equilibrium, called the cooperation equilibrium, each DM cooperates if x = 1 and defects otherwise. In the other equilibrium, called the defection equilibrium, both DMs always defect. Furthermore, from any joint policy in Π 1 × Π 2 , there is a strict best reply path to one of these two equilibria, which implies that the multi-stage game is weakly acyclic under strict best replies.
We set b = 2, c = 1, a = −1, γ = 0.3, and simulate Algorithm 1 with the following parameter values: T k = 20000, ρ i = 0.1, λ i = 0.5, δ i = 0, α i k = 1/k 0.51 , for all i, k, and without resetting the learnt Q-factors at the end of each exploration phase. Policies generated by Algorithm 1 consistently converge to one of the equilibria, as predicted by Theorem 4.1 (even though the tolerance levels are set to zero). A sample path of policies converging to the cooperation equilibrium is shown in Figure 7 .
7. Concluding Remarks. In this paper, we develop decentralized Q-learning algorithms and present their convergence properties for stochastic dynamic games under weak acyclicity. This is the first paper, to our knowledge, that presents learning algorithms with convergence to equilibria in large classes of stochastic dynamic games. The decision makers observe only their own decisions and cost realizations, and the state transitions; they need not even know the presence of the other decision makers.
Our approach has a two-time scale flavor; however, unlike the existing work on multi-time-scale learning, it does not depend on the stochastic approximation theory. Note that the existing work on multi-time-scale learning, e.g., [1, 13, 15, 14] , require the stability analysis of some ordinary differential equations (ODE) describing the mean behavior of the learning algorithms. Aside from the difficulty of choosing the step sizes running at multiple time scales, the existing work involves nonlinear ODEs whose analysis does not seem to be within reach even for dynamic team problems. In contrast, our approach leads to a considerably simpler analysis for all weakly acyclic stochastic dynamic games.
Appendix A. A Uniform Convergence Result for the Standard Q-Learning Algorithm with a Single DM.
Convergence of the standard Q-learning algorithm with a single DM is well known, [31] . However, to prove the results of this paper, we need the sample paths generated by the standard Q-learning algorithm to well behave with respect to the initial conditions. Let us now consider a single-DM version of the setup introduced in §2 where the DM index i (in the superscript) is dropped and c(x, u) representing the one-stage cost for applying control u at x is an exogenous random variable with finite variance. Let us assume that a single DM using a stationary random policy π ∈ ∆ updates its Q-factors as: for t ≥ 0,
where the initial condition Q 0 is given, u t is chosen according to π(x t ), the state x t evolves according to P [ · |x t , u t ] starting at x 0 , n t is the number of visits to (x t , u t ) up to time t, and {α n } n≥0 is a sequence of step sizes satisfying
Lemma A.1. Assume that, for all (x ′ , x, u), π(x) assigns non-zero probability to u and P [x ′ |x, u] > 0. For any ǫ > 0 and compact Q ∈ R |X×U| , there exists T Q ǫ < ∞ such that, for any Q 0 ∈ Q,
where |·| ∞ denotes the maximum norm andQ is the unique fixed point of the mapping F : X × U → X × U defined by
for all x, u.
Proof. Let {Q ′ t } t≥0 and {Q ′′ t } t≥0 be the trajectories for the initial conditions Q ′ 0 and Q ′′ 0 , respectively, corresponding to a sample path {(x t , u t , c(x t , u t ))} t≥0 . It is easy to see that, for all t ≥ 0,
is non-increasing and therefore convergent. Suppose that M t →M > 0. There exists somet < ∞ such that max t≥t M t <M (1 + 1/β)/2. Hence, we have, for all t ≥t,
Since each x, u is visited infinitely often w.p. 1,M ≤M (1 + β)/2 <M w.p. 1, which is a contradiction. Therefore, M t → 0, w.p. 1. Theorem 4 in [31] shows that, for any initial condition Q 0 , Q t →Q, w.p. 1. Hence, for any
This leads to the desired result, i.e., for any ǫ > 0 and compact Q ∈ R |X×U| , there exists
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4.1.
For any π −i ∈ ∆ −i , let F i π −i denote the self-mapping of X × U i defined by
for all x, u i . It is well-known that F i π −i is a contraction mapping with the Lipschitz constant β i with respect to the maximum norm. Recall from (2.2) that each DM i 's optimal Q-factors Q i π −i is the unique fixed point of F i π −i . We also note that, during the k−th exploration phase, each DM i actually uses the random policyπ i k defined as
where ν j is the random policy that assigns the uniform distribution on U j to each x.
where φ −i k ∈ ∆ −i is some convex combination of the policies in ∆ −i of the form where each DM j , j = i, either uses its baseline policy π j k or the uniform distribution 2 . Because there are finite number of such policies, an upper bound on
. This proves the lemma. Letδ denote the minimum separation between the entries of DMs' optimal Qfactors (with respect to the deterministic policies), defined as 3
We considerδ to be an upper bound on the tolerance levels for sub-optimality, i.e., δ i ∈ (0,δ), for all i. In that case, we also introduce an upper boundρ > 0 on the experimentation rates such that, if ρ i ≤ρ, for all i, then
Such an upper boundρ > 0 exists due to Lemma B.2.
where E k , k ≥ 0, is the random event defined as
Proof. The desired result follows from Lemma B.1 and (B.2).
B.1. Proof of part (i). Note that
Therefore, we have (B.3) P [π k+1 = π k |E k , π k ∈ Π e ] = 1, for all k.
Since we have a weakly acyclic game at hand, for each π ∈ Π, there exists a strict best reply path of minimum length L π < ∞ starting at π and ending at an equilibrium policy. Let L := max π∈Π L π . There exists p min ∈ (0, 1) (which depends only on λ 1 , . . . , λ N , and L) such that, for all k,
and φ k,J ∈ ∆ −i is a policy such that φ j k,J = π j k for j ∈ J and φ j k,J = ν j for j ∈ J ∪ {i}. 3 To avoid trivial cases, we assume Q i
Pickǫ ∈ (0, ǫ) satisfying
For the rest of this part, we assume min ℓ T ℓ ≥T . From (B.3), (B.4) , (B.5), we obtain P [π k+L ∈ Π e |π k ∈ Π e ] ≥ p min (1 −ǫ), for all k and P [π k+L = · · · = π k |π k ∈ Π e ] ≥ 1 −ǫ, for all k.
This leads to the recursive inequalities
where p k := P [π k ∈ Π e ], for all k. Note that we have, for all n,
Therefore, there existsñ < ∞ such that, for all n ≥ñ,
Finally, this means that, for all n ≥ñ and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1},
B.2. Proof of part (ii). For any ǫ > 0, letT < ∞,k < ∞ be as in part (i). Letk < ∞ be such that min k≥k T k ≥T . It is straightforward to see from the proof of part (i) that, for all k ≥k +k, we have P [π k ∈ Π e ] ≥ 1 − ǫ. We assume (B.8) (therefore (B.9)) holds for all n. This leads to
From this, it is straightforward to obtain
Due to (B.9), we have, for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1},
Therefore, for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1},
From this and (B.7), we obtain For any π = (π i , π −i ) ∈ Π i × ∆ −i , let F i π denote the self-mapping of X × U i defined by
for all x, u i . It is well-known that F i π is a contraction mapping with the Lipschitz constant β i with respect to the maximum norm. Let us denote the unique fixed point of F i π by Q i π . We also note that, during the k−th exploration phase, each DM i actually uses the random policyπ i k defined as (C.1)π j k = (1 − ρ j )π j + ρ j ν j where ν j is the random policy that assigns the uniform distribution on U j to each x. Lemma C.1. For any ǫ > 0, there exists T ǫ < ∞ such that, if T ≥ T ǫ , then
Proof. Note that each exploration phase starts with x kT , which belongs to a finite state space, and Q i kT ,Q i kT ∈ Q i , where Q i is compact, for all i. Note also that, during each exploration phase, DMs use stationary random policies of the form (C.1) and there are finitely many such joint policies. Hence, the desired result follows from Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.
Lemma C.2. For any ǫ > 0, there exists ρ ǫ > 0 such that, if ρ i ≤ ρ ǫ , for all i, then
Proof. We have
exists, which is uniform in (π i k , π −i k , φ −i k ). This leads to the first bound. The second bound can be obtained similarly.
Letδ denote the minimum separation between the entries of DMs' Q-factors (for deterministic policies), defined as 5 δ := min i,x,π i ,π i ∈Π i ,π −i ∈Π −i :
Q i (π i ,π −i ) (x,π i (x)) =Q i (π i ,π −i ) (x,π i (x)) Q i (π i ,π −i ) (x, π i (x)) − Q i (π i ,π −i ) (x,π i (x)) . 4 More precisely, φ −i k = J ⊂{1,...,N}\{i} a J φ −i k,J where a J := j∈J (1−ρ j ) j ∈J∪{i} ρ j 1− j =i (1−ρ j ) and φ k,J ∈ ∆ −i is a policy such that φ j k,J = π j k for j ∈ J and φ j k,J = ν j for j ∈ J ∪ {i}. 5 To avoid trivial cases, we assume Q i (π i ,π −i ) (x, π i (x)) = Q i (π i ,π −i ) (x,π i (x)) for some i, x, π i ,π i ∈ Π i , π −i ∈ Π −i .
for all i, k. Such an upper boundρ > 0 exists due to Lemma C.2. Lemma C.3. Suppose 0 < δ i <δ, 0 < ρ i <ρ, for all i. For any ǫ > 0, there exist T < ∞, such that, if T k ≥T , then P Ě k ≥ 1 − ǫ whereĚ k , k ≥ 0, is the random event defined aš
Proof. The desired result follows from Lemma C.1 and (C.2).
We have (C.4) P π k+1 = π k |Ě k , π k ∈ Π e = 1, for all k.
Since we have a weakly acyclic game at hand, for each π ∈ Π, there exists a strict better reply path of minimum lengthĽ π < ∞ starting at π and ending at an equilibrium policy. LetĽ := max π∈ΠĽπ . There existsp min ∈ (0, 1) (which depends only on λ 1 , . . . , λ N , and L) such that P π k+Ľ ∈ Π e Ě k , . . . ,Ě k+L−1 , π k ∈ Π e ≥p min , for all k. for all k ≥ 0. For the rest of the proof, we assume min ℓ T ℓ ≥Ť . From (C.4), (C.5), (C.6), we obtain, for all k, P π k+Ľ ∈ Π e |π k ∈ Π e ≥p min (1 −ǫ) and P π k+Ľ = · · · = π k |π k ∈ Π e ≥ 1 −ǫ.
This leads to the recursive inequalities p (n+1)Ľ ≥ (1 −ǫ)[p nĽ +p min (1 − p nĽ )], n ≥ 0 (C.7)
